Lunch with the men who built the QE2

[Rob Lightbody]

Hi,

Today I had an incredible lunch at the Royal Northern & Clyde Yacht Club (http://rncyc.com/) with some of the men who built the QE2, who were also colleagues of my father's.  I was picking their brains about QE2, and also about my Dad, since he's not around for me to ask.  They are all very much looking forward to the QE2 event next year, and will be spreading the word around others they know that helped build QE2.

Tim's amazing Steam-powered QE2 Model

Tim, who was heavily involved in the design and build of QE2's original power plant, has built an incredible steam-powered model of the QE2.  I thoroughly enjoyed seeing it, and its ridiculously complicated and detailed steam engine.  The power and speed are exactly to scale, the mast is the actual aerial for the radio-control, and the funnel is the actual one for the ship, blowing steam. She can blow her whistle, which is an exact replica of QE2's - being an actual audio recording!

My Dad, David Lightbody

My Dad's boss, Ian Broadley, respected my Dad's skills greatly and they worked together for a long time.  They all remember him well.  He was apparently known to some as, the "Heat Balance King" - which apparently involves complex calculations of what the "steam condition" is at different points through the system.  When I asked them why it was my Dad who had to fly to troubleshoot her turbines, they asked me back "who else would it be".  Nobody else was considered unless my Dad was unavailable - he was their expert.  (Parmetrada Steam Turbine expert).  My Dad worked heavily with Willie Ireland, Bob Coates and Ralph Fleeting.

The Unions

The unions killed the Clyde shipbuilding, and they watched it happen first-hand with great frustration.  Attempts to modernise and improve efficiency were met with strikes, industrial action or being "Blacked" (blacklisted by the union).  Examples they gave were of modern machinery coming in which needed less men, but the union refusing to allow redundancies and forcing the team size to remain the same. 
As things progressed, one section needed a 50% redundancy.  The manager compromised and proposed 30%.  The union insisted on less than 5%, until it was explained that the actual required figure had been 50%... it went on and on.  They met Tony Benn, had discussions with him, and weren't impressed... I'll try to get more info on this for the record.

Tim recommends a book by Sandy Stephens, I'll try to find out which one it is.

A cost-cut too far - QE2's breakdown

We've discussed QE2's cost-cutting during her design elsewhere.  Tim Henderson was involved in the cost-cutting of the powerplant - they achieved a 10% cut - the cost of the plant was £5m and they shaved off £0.5m.  Against the engineers judgement, the Steam Generator was deleted.  They are categorical that this was the cause of the famous breakdown (link) .  Tim also remembers clearly them bringing the power down from 120,000shp to 110,000shp.

John Browns Computer
We've discussed previously the state of the art Ferranti computer that was on board QE2, but what I didn't know whas that John Browns themselves had an ICL  1900 computer - British made - and the government wanted them to promote heavily that it was being used to build QE2.  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ICT_1900_series   They think it had 32kb of memory...  This was 2 major national pride projects being used to complement each other.  It highlights the importance of QE2.

The Suppliers
Were falling over themselves to supply to the QE2 project.  At one point two suppliers came in with prices that were very close.  So close as to be suspicious.  They saught a 2nd quote from a Swedish company which was significantly cheaper, and used it to lower the price from the British suppliers.

Nuclear Power
Although they all worked on Diesel and Steam-Turbine technologies, they were also working on Nuclear power and it was a big thing on the Clyde at the same time as Q3 and Q4 were being designed.  Y-ARD (Yarrow-Admiralty Research Department) that my Dad worked at too, was heavily involved.

Designed in Liverpool or Clydebank
I asked them for their views of this.  They said that yes, she was designed in Liverpool, however they had a lot of input going back into the design, and were in Liverpool every week discussing the design.  One example they gave was that John Browns knew a huge amount about building ships, but not about marketing them, or making them work in the real world, which in the mid sixties had suddenly become the Jet age.  They remember clearly the decision being taken to abandon Q3, and the team re-focussing on Q4.

They all said they looked at QE2 in later years and realised she was an absolute stunner, a very special and unique ship.

- Rob

[June Ingram]

Thank you, Rob, for this amazing commentary and insight into so many areas. It is great to hear about your Dad. It is so obvious that he was so well thought of. I hope you have another opportunity to meet with these gentlemen. Often times, a book will give the facts and figures, but the human touch will bring those facts and figures alive with such great insight !

[Lynda Bradford]

Rob, thanks for posting about your lunch with these men who built QE2.  I know it would have meant a lot to you to speak to these people as they knew your Dad. But what is so important is that there are snippets of information that would not already be known about.  I hope some of them do come along to the conference on 22 September 2017 as it would be wonderful to speak to them. 

[Clydebuilt1971]

Amazing stuff Rob - thanks for posting.

It sort of humanizes the ship in a certain way to me. I really do hope they will come along to the conference.

Gav

[Hugh Morrison]

I would like to respond to two of the matters discussed by Rob Lightbody. 
However,  before I respond  I should explain that what I say is based on first-hand knowledge. I  served my apprenticeship, and subsequently worked as a ship design draughtsman at John Brown's yard in Clydebank between August 1965 and January 1970. Although I was only a junior member of staff at that time, I was aware of many of the problems that occurred during the building of the QE2 and have made it my business, over the years, to gather information about the QE2, the Clydebank shipyard and British shipbuilding in general.
The years I spent in Clydebank were very much formative and provided me with a breadth and depth of knowledge which was in demand at an international level and which I was able to apply throughout my career. 
Albeit relatively minor, I have always been proud of my involvement in the design and construction of the QE2 but feel that any related romanticism should not distort the reality of the story of the design and construction of the vessel.
Addressing Rob's items under the sub titles used by him:
The Unions.
The statement that  'the unions killed Clyde shipbuilding' show a real bias, most of which was promoted by the media of the day and is, in some cases, still cited today.
A very good example of what is now being termed 'fake news' is contained in the book authored by Carol Thatcher, entitled ' QE2 - Forty famous years'.   In general, it is a good book, with a lot of illustrations of the QE2's working life. In the chapter which described the design and building of the vessel, Ms. Thatcher states that "The first strike came in March 1967 when the Draughtsmans' and Allied Technicians Association began a dispute which was to last over ten weeks.."
The Draughtsmans' and Allied Technicians Association (DATA) did indeed start a strike then but the strike was not in Clydebank, on the Clyde, or even in Scotland.
DATA had reached agreements with engineering companies and shipyards across the UK to implement a 'wage for age' payment scheme, where draughtsmen's and designer's salaries were on an incremental scale which reflected their respective experience. The salary scale was incremental from age 16, when the majority of apprentices began work: to age 30 when they were deemed to be fully fledged journeymen. A fair and sensible arrangement, in my opinion.
Only one major shipbuilder in UK, Swann Hunter on Tyneside, had not agree to the scheme. Upon failure of negotiations, DATA gave Swan Hunter notice that an official strike would take place at the shipyards concerned - not at any other shipyards.
The Confederation of British Shipbuilders (I am not sure of the exact name of the organisation), in cooperation with Swan Hunter, said that if DATA implemented the strike on Tyneside then all members of DATA working at all shipyards in the UK would be suspended and would not be paid while the strike on Tyneside was taking place.
I should add here that the DATA membership included not only draughtsmen but also ship design, estimating and technical purchasing and procurement staff. Apprentices, like myself, who were members of DATA were not included in the suspensions as the employers had a contractual  responsibility to provide training for a specified time period.
The strike at Swan Hunter started as planned.  The local DATA representatives in Clydebank agreed with the shipyard management (who were themselves not happy about the situation) that DATA members would no longer attend the offices until the dispute was settled: this applied in all of the Clydeside shipyards. In many other locations the employers actually prevented the DATA members from entering the shipyards. The whole dispute took on the name of the 'lock-out'.
This meant that the drawing and design and other associated offices were manned only by apprentices, senior managers and a few employees who were not DATA members.
As Ms. Thatcher correctly points out in her book, drawings represent the first step in the construction process. Having such a small number of persons involved in the production of drawings, many of those persons being inexperienced, meant that the whole construction process came to a near standstill.
After ten and a half weeks an agreement was reached on Tyneside and all DATA members returned to work.
As at other locations, members at Clydebank were understandably bitter about what had happened and the relationship between DATA members and the management and with non members, never wholly recovered.
The situation also made members of other unions afraid and suspicious that the faceless national management organisation may impose similar actions upon them.
This stoppage of almost three months, together with the distrust it generated, contributed greatly to the overall lack of progress of the QE2's construction and the eventual late delivery.
The fact that 'the first strike' mentioned in the book does not reflect an accurate representation of the situation caused me to raise questions, directly to Ms. Thatcher, as to the accuracy of her reporting of this and other disputes, asking  the source of her information and if she had validated the details before making unqualified statements which may not reflect the truth. Needless to say I received no responses to my questions.
You mention Tony Benn's involvement: his opinion is reflected in articles published by Glasgow University where the management of the Glasgow shipyards is described as feudal. That situation being the basis of the whole problem.
I cannot imagine how the government of the time allowed the 'lock-out' to occur and to continue for so long. The government had a large stake tied up in loans to Cunard, without which the ship would not have been built; they were also aware of the fragile state of British shipbuilding in general, where the result of such a dispute would have a serious impact upon the survival of the industry. 
The general situation in the shipyards with respect to industrial relations was not good. This was due to many and diverse reasons which were practiced by both sides. The image portrayed by the popular press of the time, and which is still perpetuated till this day in publications such as I discuss above, is that the workers on Clydeside were bloody minded militants. It is certainly partly true, but like most situations there are other facets to story which give a fairer view of the matter.
For reasons which are not all together clear with respect to the question of the Unions, one of Rob's sources recommends the recent book by Sandy Stephens(sic) - despite not knowing the title. The book is entitled 'Stephen of Linthouse. A shipbuilding Memoir 1950-1983.' It is indeed a good book and I have corresponded directly with the author on some of the content. The trade unions are mentioned frequently in the book, but Mr. Stephen is a sensible man and though he had his problems with the unions, he certainly recognises that the downfall of his family shipyard and of UK shipbuilding in general was due to many reasons. He most certainly does not imply nor make any unqualified statement such as 'the unions killed Clyde shipbuilding'.
If readers are interested in an unbiased account of UK shipbuilding I would recommend 'The Rise and Fall of British Shipbuilding' by Anthony Burton. The author is a professional historian, with no real axe to grind on behalf of any of the parties involved. It describes the involvement of the trade unions but certainly does not conclude that they were the main cause of the industry downfall.
Finally, one other book I would recommend is 'At the Sharp End - A shipbuilding Autobiography' by (the late) George Parker. Mr. Parker was the Technical Director at Clydebank during the building of the QE2. Many enthusiasts will probably have seen the pictures and films of him at the launch of the QE2 when he was trying to push the launch ways when the ship was slow to move on the slipway. His description of the management structure and methods used at Clydebank were far from flattering. I will not go into details now, but his opinion can be best surmised when he said that when he moved to Swan Hunter and became involved in the building of the cruise ship 'Vistafjord' he was able to do a good job having learned many of the ways not to do things while he was at Clydebank.
I am not a socialist or a trade unionist but I do have a realistic view as to how I got to where I am today. The words of Matt McGinn apply, I am sure, to almost all of us:
"I'll tell ye sumfin awfy true: you widnae have your telly the noo, if it wisnae for the union"
.... nor is it likely that Mr Lightbody and friends would be reminiscing in the Royal Northern & Clyde Yacht Club today!
John Brown's Computer.
Paraphrasing Rob's words into 'John Brown's, where the QE2 was built, had an ICL  1900 computer' gives a rather distorted view of what was the truth. It maybe sounded like a good national sales pitch, but.........
John Brown's certainly had a mainframe computer. Needless to say it was about the size of a bus with lots of punched input data cards, spinning tapes and flashing lights. It was, however, not a main player in the design of the QE2. It was used almost exclusively to calculate the weekly payroll for all of the workers in the yard; the majority at that time being paid weekly in cash. The ship design office was assigned 15 minutes per week to run technical programs. Given the size of the processor, which is much less than is now fitted in modern smartphones, you could not achieve very much in 15 minutes - very often nothing was achieved as working in 'fixed format' input and other restrictions imposed during early computing, often resulted in a dump - better luck next week! There were 2 guys in the ship design office who devoted their time to the research and development of computer programs for ship design but I am not aware of anything being produced which contributed directly to the design of the QE2. They may have used any results they got to compare with the results which were being calculated by the traditional methods. As is still the case today, computer programs had to be verified to be producing the correct results and then had to be approved by the Classification Societies, such as Lloyd's Register. It was really too early days in computing to achieve all of that back then.
The main form of  'computer' used was a 10 inch slide rule, which almost every draughtsman and designer owned  (I still have my slide rule.) In addition to the 10 inch slide rules the  ship design office had a Fuller's cylindrical slide rule which was equivalent to a 75 foot long slide rule. They also had a couple of Curta mechanical hand calculators which were about the size of a tennis ball - real hand/pocket calculators. For the larger calculations mechanical integration machines were used; the planimeter, the integrator and the integraph. (Interested persons can find out more about those pieces of equipment on the internet.)

[Lynda Bradford]

Hugh thanks for taking time to write this information about the circumstances surrounding the Draughtsman and Allied Technicians strike, which I can vaguely remember.  The subject of industrial action in the 1960's and 70's makes for very interesting reading and as you mentioned, the newspapers did not always tell the full story.  It is a vast subject, as it is important to consider the social, economic and industrial situation at the time.

Because I originate from Clydebank,  I find this an interesting subject and I hope I can find time to read the books you have recommended.  Perhaps this should have it's own topic, but we can wait and see how it develops, as you were basically responding to Rob's post. 

I was an IBM Key Punch Operator working at Singer's and other data input offices in the 1960's, so  I can relate to what you say about the computers.  Payroll, stock control, inventory was the main purpose with around twenty key punch operators and ten verifiers employed to carry out the task.  Overtime was compulsory on a Tuesday (for payroll) when you were expected to work from 8 am to 8 pm. I would key punch 7000 cards in that time.  John Brown's would be a similar set up

Can I also say that Rob's favourite Yacht Club is on the QE2 and his passion for the ship led him to set up this forum, so that we can discuss issues surrounding the building and service life of QE2. 

I hope you are coming along to the conference in September, Hugh as I am sure there will be many interesting discussions about the building of QE2. 

[Rob Lightbody]

Hugh,

Many thanks for this wonderful detailed reply!  I have sent a link to it to the men I met.

Your posting is exactly why I created this website in the first place - to capture people's memories before they are lost and to encourage people to put things into writing and share them, that they may not have done otherwise.

Most of what I said I was just relaying from the men I met, so I have no views on them.  What they said about the computer tallies with what you said - BUT regardless of what it was actually used for, the government wanted these 2 major British products to promote each other.  Spin!

I believe Carol Thatcher put her name to "her" book, and wrote the foreword, but I don't think she had any other input into it.  It was written by a Cunard writer who frequents this forum and I'd love to hear from him about this!

One thing I'd like to know more about, are the anecdotal stories of theft and vandalism before the ship left the Clyde.  I have always been sceptical about this, because it sounds like the sort of story that can be exaggerated as the years pass, and also a convenient excuse for the ships owners for anything that wasn't right.

Hugh - I am keen to know - did you look back on QE2 years later with pride at what had been achieved?

- Rob

[Hugh Morrison]

Lynda,

Yes I will be attending the conference in September.

There is a very good book which you may find interesting. It is called 'When the Clyde Ran Red' by Maggie Craig. It is not as left wing as the title suggests and gives a good social history of the Clydeside area. There is quite a lot about Singer. It says that in the early part of the 1900s Singer were the largest employer in Clydebank followed by the Beardmore shipyard and then John Brown's. It is a great pity that Beardmore's is all but forgotten today. It was one of the best and most forward thinking shipyards on the river.

[Hugh Morrison]

Rob,
Sorry for my delayed response. I have had to think about how to answer your last question.

But before that your other questions.
It was quite apparent that Carol Thatcher was just a front name for the book. When I wrote to her, via the publishers, I asked her to pass my questions to the persons in Cunard who had provided her with information. No responses!
In addition to what I have said previously about the lack of accuracy in the book, I also questioned the fact that the majority of criticism was Cunard against the shipyard, with no real responses from the shipyard other than the statement from Tony Benn.
Rather than paraphrasing what I said, following is the relevant extract from my letter (sorry it is a bit lengthy)

 With respect to your portrayal of the relationship between Cunard and the shipyard.
The majority of the criticism you quote by Cunard about the shipyard came from Mr. Dan Wallace, with most of his comments being directed against Mr. John Rannie.
Wallace and Rannie were a classic 'glass half empty' and 'glass half full' combination of personalities.
Mr. Wallace, whom I saw in the offices very regularly, never looked a very happy person. (Enoch Powell's peers' description of him as 'Powell the scowl' probably best describes the impression he gave.)
Mr. Rannie on the other hand was generally a very jovial and positive person to the point of seeming to be a bit overpowering at times. He very much led from the front and was generally liked by the Clydebank workforce.
Mr. Rannie retired after the delivery of the QE2 and was to take the burden of the blame for the late and problematic delivery of the ship. Being the man he was and recognising that he was the man at the helm at the time, he took the blame without public protest and continued to praise and promote the new ship.  He was a forward thinking person and would probably have achieved more if the John Brown group had been willing to re-invest in the shipyard which had made their name. In the early 1960s Rannie secured contracts to build jack-up oil rigs, based on American designs. Six or eight rigs were build and some investment in that new branch of technology would maybe have helped save to Clydebank yard. After leaving Clydebank Rannie was employed by a failing shipyard in Newfoundland where he successfully helped the yard back to profit.
On page 42 of your book, where you introduce the Cunard 'Design Duo', you say that when the ship was awarded to John Brown "Dan Wallace's former bosses at the yard would find themselves reporting to him." 
Personally, I feel that a large proportion of the poor relationship between Cunard and the shipyard resulted from the situation which stemmed from the consequences of that sentence.
Over the period of my long working life I have witnessed and experienced similar 'poacher turned gamekeeper' situations and in the majority of cases the story is always an unhappy one. Former employees of contractors, who become an employee of the client, often find it difficult to accept that they no longer part of the contractor's team and have no say in the day to day management of the workforce and try to dictate how the contractor should do things.
Such, I feel, was the case with Mr. Wallace. I doubt if there was any personal animosity involved or settling of old differences. He was under extreme pressure from the Cunard management and knowing how things 'worked' at Clydebank provided some advantages. However, if not applied carefully it could lead to continuous confrontation - as indeed it seemingly did.
As with your coverage of industrial disputes, I feel that no counter arguments are reported from the builder's point of view.  I realise that your co-authors have access to the history and folklore of Cunard.  Was any attempt made to gather information and obtain opinions from the shipyard and other involved parties?  The main players from the shipyard side are now dead and I imagine that the case is much the same for any Cunard persons who were around at the time.  As far as I know Glasgow University now holds the records of the Clydebank shipyard. Perhaps if somebody was sufficiently interested they could research those and other records as part of an attempt to get a balanced account of what actually occurred. I doubt, however, if anyone is sufficiently interested to make such efforts. The shipyard at Clydebank is now gone and Cunard, in name at least, enjoys success. How much of that eventual success is attributable, in part at any rate, to the demise of British shipbuilding is debatable.
However, as the saying goes  - 'The victor writes the history.'


Theft and vandalism certainly did occur. Given that security was almost zero at the yard a lot of small items were taken such as bathroom taps, etc. There were stories of plumbers having whole new QE2 bathrooms at home, but I think that was exaggeration. Lengths of carpet, mostly offcuts from the acres of carpeting on board.  Vandalism did happen. This was not confined to the QE2. It was quite a common occurrence especially when workers knew that when the work was done they would probably be paid off. Large areas were locked off on the QE2 after completion to reduce the vandalism.     The vandalism was self protection really. Not justifiable, but understandable.

Now for your difficult question: Do I look back on the QE2 years with pride at what had been achieved?

Overall my answer is yes...but!
Having been so close during the design and construction I am very aware of the mistakes which were made (both by Cunard and John Brown) and of the time and money wasted because things were not thought through at the outset, leading to constant changing during the build. Most of them are covered up, but I and many others know what is hidden inside. The aluminium superstructure and the problems building that caused is one of the larger examples - too big to go into now.
In reality John Brown should never have taken the job on under the conditions dictated by Cunard. The government loan specified it had to be a British shipyard, but all of the others had quoted above the Cunard limit.  John Brown went into it with an 'it will be alright on the night' attitude and that any losses would be compensated for by the prestige gained - not something that would happen today.
But... most people don't know all of that and are impressed when I say I worked on the QE2.
My job at Clydebank only really happened because they took on a large number of apprentices to accommodate the new ship. The training I received was second to none, with knowledge to be gained from many men who had been in Clyde shipbuilding for many years.
When the QE2 finally departed and what was a crumbling Upper Clyde Shipbuilders was all that was left, I and many others were wondering if we had got ourselves into the wrong industry - why didn't anyone tell us this was on the cards when we started??
But rescue was at hand. Many other shipyards, including quite a few in Europe realised that there was a lot of talent coming free on Clydeside and quickly came looking for the people they wanted.
One of them, Bremer Vulkan, then the biggest developer of container ships, based in Bremen, held interviews in Glasgow, Newcastle and Liverpool. As a result I went to work in Bremen.

So my QE2 years had achieved a lot, for me at any rate, so I look back on them favourably.

-Hugh

[Clydebuilt1971]

Hugh,

Thank you very much for these fascinating posts.

Sad to say that the "all right on the night" approach still happens all to often on what is left of British Industry.

I work for a well known company called James Howden & Co formerly based in Scotland Street, Glasgow now in Renfrew and believe me it still goes on in here!!

Thanks again

Gav

[June Ingram]

Thank you, Hugh, for your commentary which is very much appreciated.

"All right on the night" is very much alive across the pond too.

[Michael Gallagher]

Hugh

Many thanks for the extra detail regarding the DATA strike in March 1967. The Thatcher book - which I wrote - does state it was a strike at national level and not one specific to the yard or Scotland itself but it did result in a stoppage of work at the John Brown yard. It is a shame the limited number of words in a book does not allow a great deal on every event or strike.

You asked for the source of information?

I have copies of every stoppage notification issued by the yard to Cunard and this one deals with DATA March - May 1967.

Michael

[Lynda Bradford]

Thanks Michael for sharing the letters from John Brown's Shipyard and Cunard,relating to the strike and giving us this insight into a piece of QE2 history.   

[Hugh Morrison]

Michael,
Thank you for responding.
The  quote taken directly from 'your' book is:-
"The first major strike came in March 1967 when the Draughtsman's' and Allied Technicians' Association began a dispute that was to last over ten week, and which - the yard reported to Cunard in May - meant 'that many plans would not be produced by the previously programmed dates."
There is no mention of a dispute being at a national level, or indeed any other explanations given. To persons who do not know anything to the contrary, the clear implication is that the Clydebank shipyard draughtsmen went on strike.
The letters you provide between Cunard and John Brown are typically high level contractual correspondence which give little or no detail of the events and only provide notice of potential effects on the completion of the contract. Phrases such as 'advising you formally of the lockout of a number of our workpeople' without giving details of the numbers involved or giving any reason for such an occurrence; plus the total lack of any reference, in any of the three letters, to the situation being due to a strike by the shipyard draughtsmen, hardly represent a comprehensive source of information upon which to  base the words used in the book.  There are countless other sources available for anyone performing historical research to allow a balanced view to be formed;  for example, in newspaper records, the records of the Engineering Employers Federation and indeed in Hansard, where statements are recorded in the Commons that the actions taken by the Shipbuilding Employers Federation were acting outwith recognised industrial rules.
I fully appreciate that there are strong restrictions when writing a book and that full explanations cannot always be given. However, it would probably have cost the space of little more than one line of print to record that the draughtsmen had been locked out as part of a national action by the employers federation, rather that wrongly stating that they had started the first major strike.
Hugh.

[Hugh Morrison]

Lynda,
Sorry, but the fact that you refer to the incident being discussed as a 'strike' - which it certainly was not - takes me back to my original correspondence where I said that such 'fake news' has contributed to the seemingly inerasable myth that (only) the unions killed Clyde shipbuilding.
As you will see I have responded to Michael. I do not believe that he intentionally put wrong information into the book. It was probably a limited knowledge of the event combined with a lack of clarification of his statement. 
However, I do believe that it is important that the true facts are known and recognised.
Hugh.